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Abstract 11 
From a crime prevention perspective, food crime remains a challenge. Whilst 12 
opportunity for crime can be reduced by implementing certain measures; and 13 
addressing the potential perpetrators, their possible actions and criminal 14 
behaviour, the trade-offs which occur in the food supply chain that motivate 15 
such activity, still remains complex. These heuristic factors have led, in this 16 
study, to the consideration of ‘pinch-points’ where crime could occur as a result 17 
of capability, opportunity, motivation, rationalisation and supply chain pressure.  18 
Pinch-points can be addressed using the Food Crime Countermeasures 19 
Framework (FCCF) conceptualised in this paper. We argue that conventional 20 
anti-fraud measures: detection, deterrence and prevention are essential to 21 
support food fraud risk assessments, as are continuous interventions and 22 
response strategies. The implementation of countermeasures that initially drive 23 
prevention and deterrence and where required, detection, intervention and 24 
response form the basis of our approach. This paper focuses on the United 25 
Kingdom (UK) however it should recognised that food crime is a global issue. 26 
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 28 
                            Introduction 29 
Whilst the topic of this paper is not generally the subject of criminological 30 
discourse it is nevertheless a contemporary and patently problematic 31 
criminological issue which is currently manifesting at a practical level. It is thus 32 
important, from a crime prevention and reduction perspective to examine at this 33 
practical, operational level.  Consequentially, this paper aims to contextualise 34 
and synthesise the specialist knowledge implicit within the literature of food 35 
crime with that of crime prevention and reduction and thus as a result broaden 36 
the focus of both literatures. Whilst this study implicitly refers to the United 37 
Kingdom (UK) it is a worldwide and a cross-national crime problem and the 38 
framework presented herein has utility too at a global level. 39 
The overarching topic of this conceptual paper is that of ‘pinch-points’ 40 
because it is within context that food crime is operationalised. The term “pinch-41 
point” has been used to variously across the supply chain, safe practice and 42 
policing literature to describe 1) physical points or locations (Makwasha and 43 
Turner, 2013); 2) the weakest necessary conditions for the problems to persist 44 
when considering problem orientated policing (Read and Tilley, 2000); 3) 45 
strategic points in the supply chain such as bottlenecks where there is 46 
sensitivity to disruption and/or limited capacity (Christopher and Peck, 2004); 47 
and 4) points of intervention (Weisel, 2003) such as where external pressure 48 
can be applied e.g. regulatory pressure or stimulus (Yakovleva and Flynn, 49 
2004); or where pressure can be applied to disrupt criminal activity (Chon, 50 
2016). Pinch points can also occur as a result of supply chain pressure 51 
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(Manning et al, 2017). Wolf and Hermanson (2004) argue that pressure is one 52 
element of the “fraud diamond” model, the other three elements being 53 
capability, opportunity and motivation. Indeed, trading in an environment where 54 
there are differentiated global standards for animal welfare, environmental 55 
protection and worker welfare standards can lead to pinch points. Manning et 56 
al, (2017) argue that the existing model of the two-dimensional fraud diamond 57 
is actually three dimensional and multifaceted when the socio-economic 58 
dynamics of supply chain pressure should also be considered.   59 
In summary, a pinch-point is the location at which intervention might be 60 
expected to have the longest term of action and the widest impact (Read and 61 
Tilley, 2000) and in the context of food crime the point where interventions take 62 
place that will have the longest and widest impact on mitigating illicit behaviour. 63 
In terms of types of crime associated with the food chain this paper is 64 
considering inter-food supply chain crime i.e. criminal activity that occurs 65 
between one discrete food supply chain and another, the legal and the illicit. 66 
Conversely, intra food supply chain criminal activity is the criminal activity 67 
that occurs between actors within an otherwise seemingly legitimate food 68 
supply chain. To provide clarity the following definitions from Closs and 69 
McGarrell (2004, p. 8) are used:- 70 
 A supply chain is the combination of organisations and service providers 71 
that manage the raw material sourcing, manufacturing, and delivery of 72 
goods from the source of the commodities to the ultimate users.   73 
 Supply chain management is the inter- and intra- organisational 74 
coordination of the sourcing, production, inventory management, 75 
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transportation, and storage functions with the objective of meeting the 76 
service requirements of consumers or users at the minimum cost.  77 
Farms are just one element of the supply chain that encompasses multiple 78 
actors and stakeholders. Indeed, farm crime can be considered in terms of 79 
criminal typology such as the urban marauder (Smith, 2010) exploiting often 80 
weak levels of security and police activity in rural areas, organised criminal 81 
gangs (OCGs) that may involve a network of insider groups (such as farmers) 82 
as well as external actors who can pass on the illicit goods into wider markets 83 
and destinations (McElwee et al, 2017). Also of interest here is the farm as a 84 
defensible and thus safe space (Newman, 1972; Mawby, 2017). Traditionally, 85 
in the UK, farmers have been lax in engaging in crime prevention and crime 86 
reduction initiatives, albeit this is changing with the advent of the ‘Fortress Farm’ 87 
Concept’ (NFU Mutual, 2017). The fortress farm concept suggests that as 88 
countryside criminals increase their activity on farms the farmers as a result feel 89 
under siege and are turning their existing farmyards into protected fortresses in 90 
an effort to safeguard their property. Thus, the context in which farm, and wider 91 
food supply chain, crime is operationalised has an impact on the ‘pinch-points’ 92 
discussed herein. 93 
This paper comprises of the following sections. In the first section we 94 
examine supply chain issues, including the importance of making trade-offs. 95 
Thereafter, we investigate the concept of ‘pinch-points’ before situating the 96 
concept within the food crime prevention literature. We then consider the issue 97 
of crime vulnerability and crime prevention weakspots. This leads us to 98 
consider how to design appropriate crime prevention strategies. The paper 99 
concludes with some relevant observations.   100 
 5 
Appreciating the importance of supply chain issues 101 
Prior to discussing the concept of ‘pinch-points’ it is necessary to begin by 102 
outlining the importance of developing an understanding of the supply chain 103 
perspective because it is within this context that food crime is operationalised. 104 
Illicit behaviour is a contemporary (but ancient) theme in food supply chains in 105 
terms of academic research, industry awareness, and in emergent food related 106 
organisational and supply chain literature. Illegal activity in food supply chains 107 
is not only a discrete process operating in parallel to legal activities and supply 108 
chains, but is also embedded within authorised, licensed and permitted 109 
processes that have particular elements of opacity (see Gregson and Crang, 110 
2017; Manning et al, 2017). Since the global financial recession of 2007-08, 111 
McElwee et al, (2017) suggest that contemporary evidence from official reports 112 
and the media shows an increase in food related criminal activity including food 113 
adulteration, mislabelling of food, sheep theft, and trading in illegal halal meat. 114 
However, the strategic decision by individuals or groups to engage in informal, 115 
and criminal acts for financial gain is complex. It may be motivated by socio-116 
political factors, such as the UK Government’s austerity programme where the 117 
first fiscal and social measures were introduced in 2008. The impact of the 118 
austerity programme on the food supply chain, drove for some organisations 119 
the need to firstly be resilient, or in some cases to simply survive, and in some 120 
instances individuals and organisations focused on motives of profit 121 
maximisation and greed (Smith et al, 2017a).   122 
The food supply chain is complex and involves both the farming sector 123 
and food industries, therefore adopting a holistic approach is essential to 124 
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combatting food supply chain crime. This paper makes a start by considering 125 
the issue of ‘pinch-points’ that has been previously somewhat neglected by 126 
criminologists in this context. Organisations within the chain do not sit in 127 
isolation; they interact with external influences in their wider environment 128 
(Winter et al, 2014). Supply chains are socio-economic networks with inter-129 
related strategies, activities, dynamic components (the products, processes 130 
and technical knowledge employed) and structural elements such the key 131 
actors involved including the retailer, farmer, manufacturers processor, 132 
distributors and food service. Primary producers are the actors that provide raw 133 
material, such as farms and aquaculture secondary producers (manufacturers 134 
that enhance the value of raw materials, wholesalers, distributors) and tertiary 135 
producers, retailers and food services (see Closs and McGarrell 2004; Borghesi 136 
and Gaudenzi, 2013).  Other factors include firstly the role and influence of 137 
stakeholders such as investors, shareholders, insurers, certification bodies, 138 
governments, policy makers and regulators, civil society, amongst others; 139 
secondly the complexity of the relationships formed between stakeholders, 140 
thirdly the climate of the relationships in terms of collaborative or conflicting 141 
characteristics of association, and lastly the type of goals each actor develops 142 
(Closs and McGarrell, 2004; Borghesi and Gaudenzi, 2013).  This begs the 143 
question as to the factors that have led to this reported rise in food related 144 
criminal activity both at farm level, and across the wider supply chain and how 145 
in some circumstances illicit behaviour is rationalised by perpetrators from 146 
being the exception to becoming the norm. We investigate these factors which 147 
are arguably influenced by multiple trade-offs within the food supply chain.    148 
Trade-offs occur because in a given situation neither the decision-149 
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maker, nor wider society can have everything they want so as a result they 150 
have to compromise in some way (Campbell and Kelly, 1994). A trade-off is a 151 
mediated form of decision-making or compromise, and this type of decision-152 
making is ubiquitous at farm level when land is managed with multiple strategic 153 
and operational objectives (Klapwijk et al, 2014). Consumer trade-offs occur 154 
when they are willing to trade one attribute for another e.g. quality for price 155 
(Luce et al, 1999). Trade-offs occur at multiple levels including field, enterprise, 156 
farm, landscape or supply chain (Table 1).   157 
Take in Table 1 158 
 Research on trade-offs especially with multiple attributes and/or 159 
collective decision-making has considered the trade-off between time and cost 160 
(Feng et al, 1997); time, cost and quality (Monghasemi et al, 2015); speed and 161 
accuracy (Häubl and Trifts 2000: Franks et al. 2003; Dane and Pratt, 2007); 162 
accuracy and effort  (Johnson and Payne, 1985; Bettman et al, 1990; Häubl 163 
and Trifts, 2000; Boulis et al. 2003; Gigerenzer and Gaissnaier, 2011); 164 
accuracy and informativeness i.e. accepting errors in return for securing more 165 
informative judgments (Yaniv and Foster, 1995); cost and risk (Kerstholt, 1994); 166 
and finally benefit and harm (O’Connor et al, 2003).  167 
In addition, time pressure is a frequent element of trade-offs. Time 168 
pressure is driven by deadlines when the time available may be perceived as 169 
too short to make a decision. Multiple studies have investigated this 170 
phenomenon (Huber and Kunz, 2007). Time pressure, may also lead to a 171 
negative emotional response (Maule et al, 2000) which then affects decision-172 
making. Luce et al, (1999, p. 144) define emotional trade-off difficulty as “the 173 
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level of subjective threat a decision-maker associates with an explicit trade-off 174 
between two attributes”. Thus positive (benefit) and negative emotion (fear, 175 
harm, anxiety, threat, challenge, concern, uncertainty) and specific emotional 176 
goals (such as protecting self-esteem, maintaining a moral value or ideal) have 177 
an impact on both cognitive appraisal and decision-making. Therefore, trade-178 
offs occur at occur multiple, complex and interwoven levels and the trade-off 179 
between legality and illegality is only one of a number of decisions that supply 180 
chain actors have to take. 181 
  Humans adapt their decision-making behaviour to a given situation, or 182 
environment, often seeking to reduce the amount of associated cognitive effort 183 
required to reach the decision (Shugan, 1980; Häubl and Trifts 2000). This can 184 
occur as a conscious response or as an unconscious cognitive strategy. Thus 185 
arguably decision-making is a situated event influenced by a number of factors. 186 
Prendergast (2002) suggests that the trade–off of risk versus incentive is 187 
influenced by how risk is determined e.g. risk as measured by volatility or 188 
variance of returns by the executive, whereas for farmers it is the variance of 189 
profits or variance of yield in a given crop cycle.  190 
In this context a food crime threat can be considered to be an agent that 191 
arises from fraud, or perpetrators taking advantage of the market opportunities 192 
to substitute, or deceive, as a result of weather events, harvest failure etc. that 193 
can cause loss or harm to individuals and/or organisations. Profit maximisation 194 
in the agricultural sector is contextualised by characteristics of constant 195 
uncertainty and risk of failure due to weather, animal disease etc. and many 196 
farming organisations have limited opportunities in terms of growth orientation 197 
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and business expansion (Smith et al, 2017b). We now turn to examine these 198 
pinch-points in the supply chain that give rise to the environment where crime 199 
could occur. 200 
Appreciating the importance of pinch-points in the supply chain.                                                                                          201 
To achieve a greater understanding of the topic it is helpful to map these 202 
pinch-points. As a process, pinch-point mapping involves identifying potential 203 
bottlenecks and threats and manipulating and managing those points to ensure 204 
effective control of resources in order to meet demand (Pil and Holweg, 2006). 205 
Moreto and Clarke (2013) in their research on transnational illegal markets in 206 
endangered species highlight that crime is situational and by directing 207 
preventive measures at pinch-points this will deliver the best results in reducing 208 
the potential for criminal activity. Furthermore, different crimes will have 209 
different pinch-points. 210 
Borghesi and Gaudenzi (2013) considered four types of supply chain risk: 211 
1) market risk; 2) process risk; 3) supplier and environmental risk; and 4) the 212 
risks associated with transparency and information visibility. For a retailer, the 213 
degree of risk associated with a given supply chain actor is mediated by 214 
whether the individual or business of interest has either a given monopoly in 215 
terms of the product or service they supply i.e. they are non-substitutable or 216 
alternatively they can be easily substituted e.g. farmers all providing the same 217 
commodity. Traditional supply chain responses to managing and mitigating risk 218 
include using insurance, greater information sharing or outsourcing risk to other 219 
supply chain actors (Olson and Wu, 2011). Therefore, organisations can be 220 
driven by their shareholder or insurer demands to quantify, manage and where 221 
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possible mitigate their risk profile. As a result, retailers, manufacturers or food 222 
service may seek to adopt a systems based approach to manage, mitigate or 223 
outsource risk.  224 
Within this market context, there are multiple pressure factors that can drive 225 
illicit activity in food supply chains including rapid development of systems, 226 
logistics and technology, asymmetry in information flow, data swamping and 227 
opacity; market competition and resource scarcity, inadequate policy and 228 
market governance, lack of regulatory and market sanctions, and ultimately low 229 
probability of discovery (Charlebois et al, 2016; Manning et al, 2016; Manning, 230 
2016; Marvin et al, 2016; Manning et al, 2017). This pressure can create a 231 
series of pinch-points at informal interfaces; formal and visible interfaces; and 232 
invisible interface(s) where differentiation in stakeholder approaches to supply 233 
chain risk, organisational goals and objectives leads to trade-offs and thus give 234 
rise to illicit behaviour. Taking a transactional approach and simply developing 235 
formal risk prevention strategies (countermeasures or preventive measures) is 236 
a welcome start but not enough to address the challenge of illicit behaviour and 237 
thus address the pressures and opportunities. Countermeasures are intended 238 
to reduce criminal opportunity in food supply chains (Spink et al, 2015). The 239 
implementation of countermeasures will not only have a preventive aspect in 240 
terms of preventing an incident and also making it more unlikely in the first 241 
place, but should an incident occur appropriate countermeasures will lessen 242 
too the impact of a given incident (Mitenus et al, 2014). Capability, motivation, 243 
rationalisation, derived value propositions, and regulatory and market 244 
incentives for illicit behaviour also need to be considered when developing 245 
crime prevention strategies (Manning et al, 2016; Manning et al, 2017).  246 
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The actualisation of this pressure on capability, opportunity and motivation 247 
dynamics can be seen through the lens of recent global food scandals such as 248 
the 2013 European horsemeat scandal (Smith and McElwee, 2017); the 2017 249 
meat fraud scandal in Brazil (Manning et al, 2017), and the 2017 fipronil in eggs 250 
and composite products scandal in Europe (Kowalska et al, 2018). The lack of 251 
early and harmonised regulatory intervention in the fipronil scandal resulted in 252 
an incident affecting 56 countries (RASFF Portal, 2018; RASFF 2018; 253 
Kowalska et al, 2018). A number of contextual factors impact on criminal 254 
behaviour such as pressure, resource allocation and ownership, greed, 255 
economic inferiority, need and power relations. 256 
 257 
Situating pinch-points in the food crime prevention literature. 258 
Supply chain power is driven by the degree of power localisation or 259 
conversely distribution and each actor’s relative control of or access to 260 
resources and capital assets. Thus the risk of illicit behaviour is situational and 261 
is framed by power structures and other socio-economic factors. Successful 262 
modes of food crime in terms of the degree of financial gain, or their impact in 263 
the case of food defense (ideological food crime such as terrorism focused on 264 
the food supply chain), reflect on the quality of execution and at what point, or 265 
even if, detection actually occurs (Manning et al, 2017). The use of a pre-266 
requisite programme to minimise, and where possible eliminate, the likelihood 267 
of an unintentional food safety incident is well established in the food supply 268 
chain through the hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) approach. The 269 
alternative, i.e. the development of a countermeasures programme to minimise, 270 
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or where possible eliminate, the likelihood of a food crime threat is less well 271 
determined.  272 
In the wake of the 2013 Horsemeat Scandal, the Elliott Review determined 273 
that a national food crime prevention framework was essential to prevent a 274 
future food crime incident (Elliott Review, 2014). Preventive measures, 275 
deterrence and/or a lack of motivation to conduct food crime will also have 276 
influence. Countermeasures that address food crime vulnerability can be 277 
grouped into four categories: detection, deterrence and prevention and 278 
disruption (Spink et al, 2015; Spink et al, 2016; Soon and Manning, 2017; van 279 
Ruth et al, 2017). Detection measures can identify the activities associated with 280 
food crime, whilst deterrence includes the measures that focus on a specific 281 
type of perpetrator and their activities. Deterrence can be described as 1) the 282 
inhibition of opportunity and perpetrator activity as a result of concern over the 283 
personal consequences to themselves as a result of taking an action or the 284 
maintenance of appropriate preventive measures, or 2) countermeasures that 285 
discourage their activity (e.g. concern that the attack will fail). Prevention in this 286 
context concerns the resources employed to minimise the potential for a food 287 
crime incident to occur and ensure disruption mechanisms to address any 288 
activity if it occurs. Kirby and Penna (2010) describe prevention as those 289 
interventions that stop an incident especially where they change a process or 290 
an environment in “a sustainable manner”. In contrast Kirby and Penna (2010, 291 
p. 205) define disruption as, “a more flexible, transitory, and dynamic tactic, 292 
which can be used more generally to make the environment hostile … [breaking 293 
up] the offender’s networks, lifestyle and routines”. Disruption tactics often align 294 
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to a prevention framework, thus serving as a deterrent through inhibiting 295 
opportunity and reducing motivation to commit a crime (Kirby and Nailer, 2013). 296 
Spink et al, (2017) recommend that in order to address the root cause of 297 
food crime, in this instance fraud, food science and technology should 298 
encompass social science, business and understanding of criminology. We 299 
concur with this holistic approach using learning from a range of disciplines. To 300 
further develop the countermeasures approach advocated by Elliott, Manning 301 
and Soon (2016) compared and contrasted six existing food crime risk 302 
assessment (FCRA) models in terms of their aims, mechanisms of operation 303 
and practicalities of use. The risk assessment models were: threat analysis 304 
critical control point (TACCP), vulnerability assessment and critical control point 305 
(VACCP), the CARVER+SHOCK tool, the food protection risk matrix (Spink and 306 
Moyer, 2011), and the United States Pharmacopeial (USP) preventive food 307 
fraud management system. These operate at manufacturing and wider supply 308 
chain level rather than being farm focused. Additional models are being 309 
developed for food fraud vulnerability self-assessment including the SSAFE 310 
model (van Ruth et al, 2017). 311 
The ability to quantify the likelihood of a threat or vulnerability in a given 312 
situation is influenced by the degree of adoption of countermeasures and their 313 
effectiveness (Manning and Soon, 2016). Thus whilst FCRA is obviously of 314 
value, the preventive benefit to organisations is limited. The output from FCRA 315 
needs to be reviewed in line with any emerging or new threats otherwise the 316 
risk assessment phase does not translate into an effective, and dynamic food 317 
crime countermeasures framework (FCCF). The development of the FCCF is 318 
essential to embed preventive measures, identify relevant sources of 319 
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intelligence on changing status of risk, detect illicit activity, and ensure timely 320 
and appropriate responsive action and a countermeasures’ continuous 321 
improvement strategy. Therefore, three factors: detection, deterrence and 322 
prevention can be drawn together at regulatory, supply chain or individual 323 
business level to underpin a FCCF of integrated risk assessment and 324 
implementation of countermeasures that initially drive prevention and 325 
deterrence and where required, detection, intervention and response (Figure 326 
1). 327 
Take in Figure 1 328 
Horizon scanning is a useful crime prevention tool. Roy et al, (2014), albeit not 329 
in a crime context, describe horizon scanning, as the systematic examination 330 
of future potential threats and opportunities, resulting in the prioritisation of 331 
threats and their effective management. Therefore, horizon scanning has the 332 
potential to act as an early warning system, initiating prompt discussion and 333 
then decision making about threat mitigation (Stanley et al, 2015 p. 553). 334 
Horizon scanning can be considered as a systematic way of considering 335 
evidence about future trends and scenarios in order to determine whether an 336 
organisation is adequately prepared for potential threats and has implemented, 337 
or can readily adopt, means for their appropriate countermeasure control. 338 
Effective horizon scanning for food crime is a foundation for a FCCF i.e. 339 
considering intelligence from a range of sources, be it economic, social or 340 
environmental, in order to effectively map possible criminal scenarios 341 
associated with the materials and products that the organisation procures, 342 
produces and sells, in order to accurately identify the potential threat, the 343 
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controls required and the mechanisms for updating such assessments if the 344 
evidence (intelligence) changes in the future. 345 
 During the mapping process weak areas, pinch-points or hotspots that 346 
are vulnerable to food crime at specific stages in food supply chains or networks 347 
can be determined. Detection, mapping and prevention activities can only be 348 
developed to address known issues or activities, making TACCP and VACCP 349 
of limited value with regard to emerging crime risk or entrepreneurial, 350 
enterprising, situational crime risk that is reactive, responsive and specific to an 351 
organisation, the products it produces and the associated supply chain (Soon 352 
and Manning, 2017; McElwee et al, 2017; Smith, 2017). 353 
 Van Ruth et al, (2017) considered food supply chain vulnerability to fraud 354 
and based their conceptualisation on the elements of opportunity (suitable 355 
target in terms of time, space and technical opportunities), motivation (the 356 
economic drivers, supply and pricing,  value added product attributes where the 357 
potential to substitute an inferior product has the potential for a higher financial 358 
gain, economic environment and financial strains and culture and behaviour 359 
including business strategy and business culture) and the control measures 360 
(technical and managerial measures) linking their work to the routine activity 361 
theory developed by Cohen and Felson (1979). 362 
 Guardians are the individuals operating at national, supply chain or 363 
individual business levels (Spink et al, 2015) that have the knowledge, skills 364 
and understanding to implement a FCCF.  Although guardians do not have to 365 
have a specific intent to watch over food products and services, they can act 366 
as guardians whilst carrying out their roles as managers or handlers (Hollis and 367 
Wilson, 2014). However, vulnerability can still occur even in the presence of a 368 
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capable guardian. This is where guardianship activity can be further enhanced 369 
by monitoring activities. The combination of available / visible guardians who 370 
are also monitoring the food products / process throughout the supply chain 371 
could provide a stronger deterrent effect (Reynald, 2009; Hollis and Wilson, 372 
2014). Those individuals or teams developing FCCF need to recognise that the 373 
adoption of universal, general countermeasures based on historic threats as a 374 
‘catch all approach’ to preventing and where required managing food crime is 375 
of limited value in addressing illicit behaviour that is caused by supply chain 376 
pressure. This is because the drivers of illicit behaviour and associated 377 
opportunity, rationalisation, capability and motivation, and derived value 378 
proposition are situational and transitory.  379 
 Situational crime risk and the means to predict its occurrence has been 380 
explored within criminology and contemporary food literature (Perline and 381 
Goldschmidt, 2004; McGloin et al, 2011; Manning and Soon, 2016). Situational 382 
crime risk factors include factors such as supply chain pressure, power 383 
asymmetry, type of corporate culture, the work environment and can have a 384 
multiple, compounding impact (Perline and Goldschmidt, 2004: Carson and 385 
Bull, 2003).  Situational crime risk can be mitigated by strengthening 386 
environmental resilience (Clapton, 2014) especially by increasing the 387 
associated personal risks and difficulties associated with the crime and 388 
alternatively reducing the potential personal rewards of committing a crime 389 
(Clarke, 1995; Spink and Moyer, 2011).  390 
 The concept of crime prevention through environmental design is 391 
nothing new as the design of physical space has long been identified as being 392 
important in understanding and mitigating criminal behaviour (Newman, 1972). 393 
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Newman proposed that defensible space can be created when the physical 394 
space is structured in a way that reinforces the social structure that defends 395 
itself i.e. a farm or factory design could in itself help or hinder the social culture 396 
of the organisation in which people work and their psychological engagement 397 
with the space itself. This idea of defensible space is developed by van Ruth et 398 
al, (2017) into a concept of hard controls (physical and technical 399 
countermeasures) and soft controls which reflect the managerial controls that 400 
are in place. Appropriate countermeasures that are based on the concept of 401 
defensible space can be adopted in a preventive approach to crime in the food 402 
supply chain. Here we take this further to consider Newman’s four themes of 403 
defensible space and these have been adapted in this conceptual research to 404 
considerations of a food supply chain environment: van Ruth et al, (2017) 405 
differentiate between external environment that consists of three levels 1) the 406 
direct supplier and customers; 2) the wider supply chain and industry network 407 
and 3) the international and national environment as opposed to the internal 408 
environment within the business. The four elements discussed here are 409 
territoriality, surveillance, image and milieu or juxtaposition: 410 
 Territoriality – creates a sense of legitimate and illegitimate access to 411 
space i.e. identifying the legitimate allocation of space to those who are 412 
approved to work in the area and those who should not have access. Food 413 
industry protocols that address territoriality will assure that appropriate 414 
people are in a given space (production line, factory), wear colour coded 415 
protective clothing by location as this will create a visual territoriality that 416 
should prove a deterrent to illicit individuals entering that space who would 417 
be readily identified if they are not in appropriate clothing. Whilst territoriality 418 
 18 
can be addressed by protocols in processing, storage and defined spaces 419 
such as farmyard areas, it proves more problematic at the field level where 420 
in the UK access often cannot be limited or prevented. Further if the 421 
perpetrators of crime are not outsiders or strangers, but are instead 422 
members of the community such as other farmers and/or professional rural 423 
offenders with legitimate reasons for access to a given location then 424 
legitimacy of access will have less influence on crime prevention (Mawby, 425 
2017). Therefore this option to mitigate food crime can only be used in 426 
certain situations. 427 
 Surveillance – designing the physical space in a way that assists legitimate 428 
users to observe the behaviours of both employees and visitors e.g. 429 
temporary workers, service engineers, contract cleaners etc. Again this 430 
approach is of value in a bounded work environment where territoriality and 431 
surveillance can combine, but harder to implement at the field level; 432 
 Image – a sense that the physical space is well cared for and developing 433 
preventive measures that reduce the visual appearance that areas of the 434 
factory, farm, distribution centre or manufacturing site are remote, little 435 
used, or not regularly visited; and 436 
 Milieu or juxtaposition – which, in the context of a food supply chain, 437 
describes the image, natural surveillance and territoriality of other 438 
businesses that interface with the organisation’s space. This element 439 
reflects that other businesses in the supply chain may either not be 440 
addressing defensive space or may undertake opaque practices or lack 441 
transparency.  442 
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The example given here is one of defensive space in the physical context. The 443 
other area of defensive space is more ethereal, such as data storage, data 444 
exchange and cyber-related space. Cybersecurity can be described as the 445 
countermeasures taken to protect a computer system and associated storage 446 
clouds or individual appliance against an intentional malicious target attack 447 
and/or unauthorised access and unintentional or accidental access. 448 
Cybersecurity countermeasures include, but are not limited to, developing 449 
cybersecurity policies and procedures, undertaking focused FCRA, adopting 450 
training and awareness sessions for staff commensurate with an individual staff 451 
member’s responsibilities and developing soft or hard controls such as specific 452 
software, firewalls, technologies etc. that can protect the organisation’s cyber 453 
environment and their electronic assets (Manning, forthcoming).  454 
However, preventive environmental design to mitigate food crime risk is of 455 
limited benefit if there is high-level insider complicity i.e. the involvement of the 456 
business owner, management or employees in criminal activity in illegal 457 
practices such as covert operations by running out of hours processing known 458 
only to a select few (McElwee et al, 2017). Therefore, consideration of the 459 
impact of the processing environment and the wider supply chain environment 460 
is of value, but it cannot address all potential threats and is not as a result a 461 
zero risk approach. However the theory of defensive space does lend itself to 462 
adoption within an overarching FCCF.  463 
In this respect, the concept of hurdles is of interest. Spink et al, (2015) define 464 
hurdles in the context of food crime prevention approaches as the transactional, 465 
formal system components that reduce opportunity for food crime by either 466 
assisting detection or proving to be a deterrent. These would include on-line 467 
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monitoring and verification activities in the wider supply chain such as audits 468 
and product sampling. Verification is discussed in more detail later in the paper. 469 
Thus a hurdle gap can be described as a vulnerability to food crime where such 470 
mitigation activities are not in place, or alternatively are in place, but are not 471 
effective.   472 
 473 
Determining crime vulnerability and identifying crime prevention 474 
weakspots 475 
Food criminals are clandestine, stealthy, and actively seek to avoid 476 
detection (Spink, 2011). According to the Centre for the Protection of National 477 
Infrastructure (CPNI, 2013), the majority of insider criminal activity in 478 
organisations was carried out by permanent staff (88%), with only 7% of cases 479 
involving contractors and 5% involving agency or temporary staff. Individuals 480 
who had worked for their organisation for less than 5 years represented 60% of 481 
cases and 49% of cases were by perpetrators aged between 31 and 45. More 482 
males (82%) were involved in insider activity compared to females (18%). 483 
These data were derived from 120 UK-based insider cases from both public 484 
and private organisations from a range of industry sectors, not just food, where 485 
financial gain was the single most common primary motivation (47%), ideology 486 
(20%), desire for recognition (14%) and loyalty to friends, family or country 487 
(14%). This literature and other sources lends itself to categorising food criminal 488 
according to type (see Spink and Moyer, 2013; Manning et al, 2016; PAS, 96: 489 
2017) and by inference developing appropriate preventive strategies.  490 
Crime vulnerability is the extent to which an individual, organisation, supply 491 
chain or national food system is at risk from, or susceptible to, attack, emotional 492 
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injury or physical harm, or damage from intentional illicit activity (Manning and 493 
Soon, 2016). Vulnerability can be assessed, using input from legal, intelligence, 494 
medical, scientific, economic, and political sources, to determine the scientific, 495 
economic, political, and social circumstances of a country in order to quantify 496 
the degree of threat and to set priorities for resources (Manning et al, 2005; 497 
WHO, 2002). Vulnerability ranking is not static and needs to be routinely 498 
reassessed to ensure that the ranking and prioritisation of crime risk remains 499 
appropriate and that suitable countermeasure(s) continue to be in place. 500 
McElwee et al, (2017) argue that in order to mitigate the potential for food crime 501 
in the supply chain two approaches can be followed: firstly to design food supply 502 
chains with built in risk-tolerance to crime and secondly to have appropriate 503 
strategies in place to contain the damage once an undesirable event has been 504 
identified. The magnitude of food crime risk (and to whom) will depend on the 505 
likelihood and severity of each type of incident and the degree of 506 
implementation of preventive and mitigation measures which can also be 507 
affected by the efficacy of guardians and hurdles (Spink et al, 2015). Thus as 508 
previously outlined in this paper there is no silver bullet of solutions to address 509 
food crime instead holistic, situation-specific product and process crime 510 
prevention strategies need to be adopted. 511 
 512 
Designing appropriate crime prevention strategies 513 
  Regulators seek to reduce illegal activities either though punitive command 514 
and control measures, prosecution and detection systems or alternatively via 515 
preventative or deterrence measures such as awareness education and 516 
enterprise support (Smith et al, 2017b). Alternatively, market orientated or 517 
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supply chain approaches need to drive a crime prevention strategy based on 518 
reduced opacity and more transparency and access to information in the supply 519 
chain (the milieu). Supplier monitoring protocols need to include not only 520 
product related procurement activities but also ethical codes of conduct, 521 
integrity screening and whistleblowing protocols (van Ruth et al, 2017), 522 
standard reference checks, financial status checks, and consideration of the 523 
supplier’s surge capacity and flexibility i.e. the ability to deliver increased 524 
quantities at short notice, if required (Beil, 2009). A financial status check can 525 
be incorporated into a suppliers’ ranking and performance weighting and the 526 
scoring system that can highlight and reflect financial risk associated with a 527 
given supply base.  This data will support FCRA that focuses on identifying the 528 
suppliers who could be subject to the supply chain pressures described earlier 529 
in this paper e.g. failed harvest, volatility in commodity price (wheat, milk, meat) 530 
etc. and as a result be more likely to undertake illicit activities. These “high-risk” 531 
suppliers can then be tracked and monitored. Price is one of the most important 532 
factors used in supplier selection, but it is critical to ensure that the objectivity 533 
of assessing product integrity and food crime risk is not lost in a purely risk: 534 
financial reward; or time versus accuracy trade-off.  535 
Forensic accounting has been adopted as a food crime countermeasure 536 
especially to identify “false” suppliers (Power, 2013). Traceability tests and 537 
second party and third party supply chain audits will provide more information 538 
for focused forensic accounting and combined audits can be developed (Figure 539 
2). 540 
Take in Figure 2 541 
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Indeed, it was a recommendation of the Elliott Review (2014) that the UK 542 
government should “support the work of standards owners in developing 543 
additional audit modules for food fraud prevention and detection incorporating 544 
forensic accountancy and mass balance checks.” Traceability protocols adopt 545 
as a minimum the regulatory one step backward and one step forward tracking 546 
and trace principle  (EU Regulation No. 178/2002) or market protocols can 547 
require traceability throughout from field to fork and the reverse too in a given 548 
supply chain. However, with multiple ingredients used to make composite 549 
products, and lengthy and complex food supply chains traceability can prove 550 
difficult in practice.  Additionally, if an individual business within the supply chain 551 
deliberately and unanimously decides to behave illicitly, they can choose to 552 
circumvent orthodox supply chain traceability countermeasures, controls and 553 
monitoring.  Therefore the value of developing a traceability countermeasures 554 
is the promotion of food integrity and developing an open transparent supply 555 
network. Procedural controls for traceability in themselves are not enough to 556 
ensure consistent compliance and prevent the opportunity for illicit activity. 557 
Further actions are needed including an effective verification (or surveillance) 558 
programme that ensures that the controls are in place and adequate. 559 
The process of food production involves discrete production stages from 560 
farm to fork i.e. during growing, harvesting / slaughtering / catching of primary 561 
products, primary processing, secondary processing of food / food ingredients, 562 
packaging, labelling, storage and dispatch. These are all pinch-points where 563 
food crime activities could occur. At the manufacturing stage specifically, 564 
countermeasures need to be adopted to address the process vulnerabilities 565 
that can provide opportunity for food crime earlier in the supply chain.  566 
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During processing, itself potential deliberate contamination of food products 567 
or tampering with processes can be minimised via limited accessibility through 568 
engineering design (hard controls) and consideration as to the accessibility of 569 
production equipment and where needed re-engineering of equipment to 570 
prevent access e.g. covered conveyors, use of sight glasses, zoning (place) 571 
and creating a buddy-system to limit lone workers at high-risk processes such 572 
as use of expensive ingredients, or for recipe use where such information is 573 
deemed confidential. Tracer ingredients can be added to high value food so 574 
that potential counterfeit product can be readily identified in production and post 575 
packing. Further supply chain preventive countermeasures include numbered 576 
and tamper-proof seals on delivery vehicles and bulk storage silos, stock 577 
control measures such as computerised fill level equipment which relay the 578 
information back to central computerised systems, reduced electronic access 579 
to specific physical zones which are deemed high-risk via fingerprint 580 
technology, codes and passwords (PAS 96, 2017) password protection of 581 
computer terminals and electronic process management systems etc.   582 
 Appropriate assessment measures that demonstrate whether the FCCF 583 
is effective include substitution profit assessments, suppliers’ ranking and 584 
ongoing performance monitoring, risk rating of likelihood of perpetrators to 585 
conduct activities, assessments to determine the likelihood of detection, 586 
severity or impact of practices, consideration of the effectiveness of preventive 587 
countermeasures and other factors that influence the risk of food crime such as 588 
history of occurrences, seasonality, and market prices. The formal FCCF 589 
systems,  being visible and auditable, provide objective evidence to internal and 590 
external stakeholders of the organisation’s commitment to combatting food 591 
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crime (Power, 2013). However this approach does not, according to Power, 592 
build the soft knowledge required in terms of inspector skills to interpret audit 593 
results. This means that a new type of balanced score card of soft, culture-594 
based risk factors also needs to be developed so that it can be effectively 595 
verified. This development is worthy of further study and empirical research.  596 
Assessing the efficacy of the FCCF encompasses both the technical areas 597 
of responsibility within the food supply chain as equally as the administrative 598 
areas of responsibility, so food auditors (food crime / fraud assessors) need to 599 
work hand in hand with appropriately trained accountants, purchase ledger 600 
administrators etc. The consistency of records and documentation can be 601 
assessed via processes such as forensic accounting, and mass balance testing 602 
for discrete batches allows unusual and inappropriate trends to be identified. 603 
Market knowledge is essential to undertake this assessment effectively 604 
especially because as described in this paper the risk is situational and 605 
dynamic.   606 
Verification through documentation review and classical food supply chain 607 
auditing provides the food crime auditor with a range of evidence or audit 608 
observations, which can be both qualitative, e.g. interviews, observations and 609 
records or quantitative and based on measurement and test. System failure can 610 
occur through people (human failure), process failure and place (i.e. design) 611 
that provides opportunity for perpetrators to commit food crime. Therefore 612 
verification activities need to include all of these areas in their scope.  613 
The work of Newman has been introduced here and combined with the 614 
literature from food supply and food crime risk identification and mitigation in a 615 
novel approach. The need to address pinch-points and seek to prevent criminal 616 
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activity occurring requires the translation of the theory of defensive space from 617 
a previously urban-centric setting to one that reflects rural crime prevention too. 618 
Crime in the food supply chain is not victimless, as the cost of such criminal 619 
activity is ultimately met by food consumers. Further food consumers are being 620 
misled, misinformed and cheated when such criminal activity occurs. Mawby 621 
(2017) argues that crime prevention need to focus on locations where crime 622 
most commonly occurs, defined here as pinch-points, rather than exclusively 623 
on the circumstances that influence offending. It is important to state that 624 
defensive space is posited here not just in terms of localised guardians and 625 
physical hurdles, but for the food supply chain as a whole in terms of symbolic 626 
hurdles and cyber-based hurdles rather than how the theory has historically 627 
been used in wider criminological literature. For example further research work 628 
could be undertaken to develop a food supply chain based “secured by design” 629 
(SBD) approach to identify pinch-points and then a strategy of combined 630 
activities to prevent crime from occurring. 631 
 632 
                       Conclusion 633 
This conceptual paper has developed our collective knowledge on how 634 
an understanding of pinch-points and the FCCF presented advances our 635 
understanding of the holistic nature of contemporary crime prevention 636 
techniques used in the food supply chain. Conventional anti-fraud measures: 637 
such as detection, deterrence and prevention are essential to support FCRA, 638 
as are continuous interventions and response strategies. The implementation 639 
of countermeasures that initially drive prevention and deterrence and where 640 
required, detection, intervention and response form the basis of our approach. 641 
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Pinch-points are not dissimilar to vulnerability points. Identification of pinch-642 
points and applying intervention strategies within the food supply chain – will 643 
provide positive impact in reducing food crime. One way to address the pinch-644 
points is via the FCCF. In addition to the conventional deterrence, detection 645 
and prevention methods, the FCCF emphasizes a circular or a feedback 646 
mechanism to ensure continuous interventions are successfully implemented. 647 
The countermeasures cover a range of potential pinch points and vulnerabilities 648 
or can be targeted measures that act against unique risks and perpetrators. 649 
The situational aspects of crime, often driven by trade-offs, in the food supply 650 
chain means that holistic mechanisms need to be developed that address both 651 
social aspects of rationalisation and also motivational economic aspects of 652 
opportunity and capability and the potential for such crimes to go undiscovered.                     653 
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Table 1. Types of Trade-off (Adapted from Klapwijk et al, 2014)  979 
Trade off Examples 
Field level Production yields versus nitrate/phosphate leaching and 
water quality 
Enterprise level (crop or animal) Grain versus crop residue 
Milk versus meat production 
Farm/agricultural system level Cropping plans/enterprise mix 
Diversification 
Maximising short-term versus long-term return 
Landscape level (agricultural 
system versus spatial, 
environmental or socio-cultural 
objectives 
Land use and ecosystem services 
Water use 
Supply chain Specification versus food waste 
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FIGURE 1. Steps in developing a food crime countermeasures framework (FCCF). *Via food crime risk assessment 
(FCRA), known threats may be prevented, deterred or detected. Via continuous interventions including horizon scanning, 
































Before audit, determine types of product, ingredients needed and market trends 
During audit, follow detailed floor plan to confirm documented product flow matches on-
site production and there are no hidden areas 
Mass balance test (Input quantity [minus expected process losses] = output quantity) 
Materials at incoming goods are cross referenced to purchase orders / laboratory records of 
tested incoming goods 
Conduct forensic accounting (i.e. market price trends; are buying records always the 
same?) 
FIGURE 2. Forensic accounting and food crime prevention audits (adapted from 
Jack, 2015; NSF 2014) 
